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Abstract: Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among
players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory,
only single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been stud-
ied, therefore nothing is known for infinitely repeated quantum game. Investigating
infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games does not much differ
from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated
quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterat-
ing a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that
is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum
game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma and
repeated classical prisoner’s dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution
is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is
sufficiently strong. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of
the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma.
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1 Introduction and Summary
In our study on repeated quantum games, we aim at exploring long term relations
among players and efficient quantum strategies that may make their payoff maximal
and can become equilibria of the repetition of quantum games. The first work of an
infinitely repeated quantum game was presented by one of the author in [1] and there
are still many open questions on the repeated quantum games. For example the detail
of the folk theorem of quantum games has not been explored yet. To investigate more
on the quantum game theory, we address an infinitely repeated quantum prisoner’s
dilemma and show the folk theorem of the repeated quantum game. The main
contributions of our work to quantum game are Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.8. By
Theorem 3.7, we claim that mutual cooperation cannot be an equilibrium when
players are maximally entangled and reward for cooperating is not enough. This fact
distinguishes a repeated quantum game from a repeated classical game. Note that
mutual cooperation is an equilibrium of the classical repeated prisoner’s dilemma.
By Theorem 3.8, we present the quantum version of the Folk theorem, which assures
the existence of equilibrium strategies for any degree of entanglement.
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In the sense of classical games, players try to maximize reward by choosing
strategies based on opponents’ signals obtained by measurement. In a single stage
prisoner’s dilemma, mutual cooperation is not a Nash equilibrium [2] but a Pareto
optimal, however when repetition of the game is allowed, such a Pareto optimal
strategy can be an equilibrium of the repeated game. A study on a repeated game
aims at finding such a non-trivial equilibrium solution that can be established in a
long term relationship. From this viewpoint repeated games play a fundamental role
in a fairly large part of the modern economics. Hence repeated quantum games will
become important when quantum systems become prevalent in many parts of the
near future society.
There are various definitions of quantum game [3, 4] and it is as open to estab-
lish the foundation. Indeed, many authors work on quantum games with various
motivations [5, 6]. Most of the conventional works on quantum games focus on some
single stage quantum games, where each one plays a quantum strategy only one time.
However, in a practical situation, a game is more likely played repeatedly, hence it
is more meaningful to address repeated quantum games. Repeated games are cate-
gorized into (1) finitely repeated games and (2) infinitely repeated games. However,
equilibria of finitely repeated games are completely the same as those of single round
games. This is also true for at most finitely repeated quantum games [7, 8]. On
the other hand, infinitely repeated (classical) games are very different from single
stage games and therefore it is important [9, 10]. But nothing has been known for
infinitely repeated quantum games.
This work is organized as follows. In Sec.2, we address single round quantum
prisoner’s dilemma and investigate equilibria of the game. We first prepare termi-
nologies and concepts used for this work. We present novel relations between payoff
and entanglement in Sec.2.2. In Sec.3 we establish the concept of a generic repeated
quantum game (Definition 3.1) and present some equilibrium strategies (Lemma 3.3
and 3.5). Our main results (3.7 and 3.8) are described in Sec.3.3. This work is
concluded in Sec.4.
2 Single Round Quantum Games
2.1 Setup
We consider the quantum prisoner’s dilemma (Fig. 1) [3, 4]. Let |C〉 , |D〉 be two
normalized orthogonal states that represent "Cooperative" and "Defective" states,
respectively. Then a general state of the game is a complex linear combination,
spanned by the basis vectors |CC〉 , |CD〉 , |DC〉 , |DD〉. Each player i chooses a
unitary strategy Ui and the game is in a state
|ψ〉 = J †(UA ⊗ UB)J |CC〉 , (2.1)
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where J gives some entanglement. In what follows we use
J = exp
[
i
θ
2Y ⊗ Y
]
= cos θ2 + iY ⊗ Y sin
θ
2 , (2.2)
where θ represents entanglement and two states become maximally entangled at
θ = pi2 . We assume a quantum strategy of a player i has a representation
Ui = αiI + i (βiX + γiY + δiZ) (αi, · · · , δi ∈ R) (2.3)
where the coefficients obey α2i + · · ·+ δ2i = 1.
Bob:C Bob:D
Alice:C (r,r) (s,t)
Alice:D (t,s) (p,p)
Table 1. Pay-off matrix of the prisoner’s dilemma. p,r,s and t satisfy t > r > p > s ≥ 0.
Based on Fig.1, Alice receives payoff $A =
〈
ψ
∣∣∣ $ˆA ∣∣∣ψ〉, where $ˆA is her payoff
matrix
$ˆA = r |CC〉 〈CC|+ p |DD〉 〈DD|+ t |DC〉 〈DC|+ s |CD〉 〈CD| . (2.4)
Without loss of generality, we can set s = 0. Taking into account of UA (2.3), the
average payoff $ˆA = $ˆA(xA, xB) of Alice is a function of xi = (αi, · · · , δi)
$A(xA, xB) = r(αAαB − δAδB + sin θ(βAγB + γAβB))2
+ p(βAβB − γAγB + sin θ(αAδB + δAαB))2
+ t(γAαB + βAδB + sin θ(−αAβB + δAγB))2
+ cos2 θ
(
r(αAδB + δAδB)2 + p(βAγB + γAβB)2
+t(βAαB − γAδB)2
)
.
(2.5)
Since the game is symmetric for two players, $A(xA, xB) = $B(xB, xA) is satisfied.
Figure 1. The setup of the quantum game.
Definition 2.1. A quantum strategy U is called pure if a player chooses one from
{I,X, Y, Z}.
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Definition 2.2. A quantum strategy U is called mixed if a player choose one from
{I,X, Y, Z} with some probability.
There are some references which define a pure quantum strategy by a general uni-
tary group (see [11] for example). But as we will show, such a small set {I,X, Y, Z}
is powerful enough to obtain stronger results compared with classical games.
The classical pure strategic prisoner’s dilemma allows players to choose one of
{I,X} and it becomes a mixed strategy game if the state is written as
|ψ〉 = ∑
i∈{CC,CD,DC,DD}
pi |i〉 , (2.6)
where pi is non-negative and satisfy
∑
i pi = 1. Note that for a single round quantum
game, a generic state is represented as
|ψ〉 = ∑
i∈{CC,CD,DC,DD}
ci |i〉 , (2.7)
where ci is a complex number and a state |i〉 is measured with the probability |ci|2.
However as long as one considers a single round game, the quantum game is resemble
to the classical mixed strategy game, where a strategy is chosen stochastically with
a given probability distribution.
Considering repeated quantum games is a way to make quantum games much
more meaningful, since transition of quantum states is different from that of classical
states. To begin with, we first address single round quantum prisoner’s dilemma and
equilibria of the game.
2.2 Equilibria
2.2.1 Without Entanglement θ = 0
The case without entanglement corresponds to the classical prisoner’s dilemma. Ta-
ble 2 presents the correspondence between operators and classical actions.
I X Y Z
I (C,C) (C,D) (C,D) (C,C)
X (D,C) (D,D) (D,D) (D,C)
Y (D,C) (D,D) (D,D) (D,C)
Z (C,C) (C,D) (C,D) (C,C)
Table 2. Operators and actions for the case without entanglement θ = 0.
Then the strategy is simply a mixed strategy of the pure strategies {C,D},
therefore average payoff of Alice is
$A = r(α2A + δ2A)(α2B + δ2B)
+ p(β2A + γ2A)(β2B + γ2B)
+ t(β2A + γ2A)(α2B + δ2B).
(2.8)
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As a result, UA = i(βAX + γAY ), UB = i(βBX + γBY ) is the equilibrium.
2.2.2 Maximally Entangled θ = pi/2
In contrast to the case without entanglement, the strategy part of the maximally
entangled case becomes
J †(I ⊗X)J = (I ⊗X)J 2 = −Y ⊗ Z (2.9)
J †(I ⊗ Y )J = I ⊗ Y. (2.10)
Therefore the correspondence between the operators and actions becomes non-trivial
as exhibited in Table 3.
I X Y Z
I (C,C) (D,C) (C,D) (D,D)
X (C,D) (D,D) (C,C) (D,C)
Y (D,C) (C,C) (D,D) (C.D)
Z (D,D) (C,D) (D.C) (C,C)
Table 3. Operators and actions for the maximal entangled case θ = pi2 .
Pure Quantum Strategy We first consider the pure strategy game, where each
agent determines and plays one of {I,X, Y, Z}. The average payoff of Alice is
$A(xA, xB) = r(αAαB − δAδB + βAγB + γAβB)2
+ p(βAβB − γAγB + αAδB + δAαB)2
+ t(γAαB + βAδB − αAβB + δAγB)2.
(2.11)
This can be written as
$A = r(α′A)2 + p(β′A)2 + t(γ′A)2, (2.12)
where
α′A = αAαB − δAδB + βAγB + γAβB
β′A = βAβB − γAγB + αAδB + δAαB
γ′A = γAαB + βAδB − αAβB + δAγB
δ′A = γBαA + βBδA − αBβA + δBγA
(2.13)
Note that the equation (2.13) is a coordinate transformation on S3, hence there is a
xA ∈ S3 that makes γ′A = 1 for all xB ∈ S3. In other words, Alice can find a stronger
strategy for any strategy of Bob, and vice versa. Therefore there is no equilibrium
for this case. In this sense this looks like "Rock-paper-scissors" .
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Mixed Quantum Strategy We can find equilibria when we allow Alice and
Bob play mixed quantum strategies. That means Alice chooses a strategy from
{I,X, Y, Z} with probability pA = (pAI , pAX , pAY , pAZ). The game will be played with a
circuit shown in Fig.2. Alice can execute her strategy UA in such a way that
UA =
√
pAI I ⊗ I +
√
pAXiX ⊗ I +
√
pAY iY ⊗X +
√
pAZiZ ⊗X (2.14)
Then the average payoff of Alice is given by
$A =
(
pAI p
A
X p
A
Y p
A
Z
)

r t s p
s p r t
t r p s
p s t r


pBI
pBX
pBY
pBZ
 (2.15)
We find that the above form can be written as
$A = rpBI + tpBX + spBY + ppBZ
+
(
pAX p
A
Y p
A
Z
)
(r − s)(−pBI + pBY ) + (t− p)(−pBX + pBZ )
(t− r)(pBI − pBX) + (p− s)(pBY − pBZ )
(r − p)(−pBI + pBZ ) + (t− s)(pBY − pBX)
 (2.16)
Figure 2. The setup of the mixed quantum game
If pBI = pBX = pBY = pBZ = 14 , the average payoff of Alice does not depend on p
A
and it becomes
$A =
r + t+ s+ p
4 . (2.17)
So one of the equilibria is  p
A? =
(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
)
pB
? =
(
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4
) (2.18)
In addition, we have another equilibrium.
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Proposition 2.3. If t+ s > r + p, then p
A? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
pB
? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
) or
 p
A? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
) (2.19)
is an equilibrium. The average payoff at the equilibrium is t+s2 .
Proof. It is enough to show one of (2.19). Using (2.16), we find that the average
payoff of Alice respects
$A(pA, pB
?) = r + p2 + (p
A
X + pAY )
1
2(t− p− r + s) (2.20)
≤ t+ s2 = $A(p
A?, pB
?) (2.21)
Similarly the average payoff of Bob satisfies
$B(pA
?
, pB) = t+ s2 − (p
B
X + pBY )
1
2(t− p− r + s) (2.22)
≤ t+ s2 = $B(p
A?, pB
?). (2.23)
This ends the proof.
Repeating the same discussion, we can show the following statement.
Proposition 2.4. If t+ s < r + p, then p
A? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
) or
 p
A? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
pB
? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
) (2.24)
is an equilibrium. The average payoff at the equilibrium is r+p2 .
2.2.3 In-between
Pure Quantum Strategy We consider a general case with entanglement θ ∈
(0, pi/2). Without entanglement θ = 0, both X, Y are always stronger than I, but I
is sometimes stronger than X when there is some entanglement. Y is always stronger
than I. So in what follows we first assume Bob plays UB = Y , which corresponds to
xB = (0, 0, 1, 0). In this case, the payoff of Alice is
$A(xA, xB) = (r sin2 θ + p cos2 θ)
− (p cos2 θ − (t− r) sin2 θ)δ2A
− (r − p) sin2 θγ2A
− (r sin2 θ + p cos2 θ)α2A.
Note that the first term is always positive, the third and fourth terms are always
negative since r > p > 0. The second term could be positive if sin2 θ < p
t−r+p .
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Therefore Alice’s best reaction to UB = Y is xA = (αA, βA, γA, δA) = (0, 1, 0, 0) and
the corresponding payoff is
$A(x?A, x?B) = r sin2 θ + p cos2 θ. (2.25)
Similarly one can find that Bob’s best reaction to xA = (0, 1, 0, 0) is xB =
(0, 0, 1, 0). So the pair of x?A = (0, 1, 0, 0) and x?B = (0, 0, 1, 0) is an equilibrium since
they satisfy
$A(x?A, x?B) ≥ $A(xA, x?B)
$B(x?A, x?B) ≥ $A(x?A, xB)
(2.26)
More generally one can find that{
x?A = (0, cosφ, sinφ, 0)
x?B = (0, sinφ, cosφ, 0)
(2.27)
is an equilibrium and the corresponding average payoff of Alice is
$A(x?A, x?B) = r sin2 θ + p cos2 θ. (2.28)
Equilibrium strategies do not exist if sin2 θ > p
t−r+p , which is consistent with our
previous discussion that the maximal entanglement θ = pi2 case does not have any
equilibrium while only pure quantum strategies are played.
Mixed Quantum Strategy In general the average payoff of Alice can be written
as
$A =
(
pAI p
A
X p
A
Y p
A
Z
)
A

pBI
pBX
pBY
pBZ
 (2.29)
A =

r s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ s r cos2 θ + p sin2 θ
t cos2 θ + s sin2 θ p p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ t
t p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ p t cos2 θ + s sin2 θ
r cos2 θ + p sin2 θ s s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ r

(2.30)
We define
t¯ = t cos2 θ + s sin2 θ
r¯ = r cos2 θ + p sin2 θ
p¯ = p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ
s¯ = s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ
(2.31)
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and
p?I = p?Z =
1
2
s+ s¯− p− p¯
t+ t¯− r − r¯ − p− p¯+ s+ s¯
p?X = p?Y =
1
2
t+ t¯− r − r¯
t+ t¯− r − r¯ − p− p¯+ s+ s¯
(2.32)
Proposition 2.5. pA = pB = p? is an equilibrium
Proof. The equation (2.30) can be decomposed into
$A =
(
r s¯ s r¯
)

pBI
pBX
pBY
pBZ

+
(
pAX p
A
Y p
A
Z
)
t¯− r p− s¯ p¯− s t− r¯
t− r p¯− s¯ p− s t¯− r¯
r¯ − r s− s¯ s¯− s r − r¯


pBI
pBX
pBY
pBZ
 (2.33)
One can show that the second term vanishes at pB = p?. Therefore $A(pA, p?) =
$A(p?, p?) is satisfied for any pA. Since the same argument is held for Bob’s average
payoff, (pA, pB) = (p?, p?) is an equilibrium.
In addition, we can find another equilibrium for t+ s > r + p and t+ s < r + p.
We first address the case where t+ s > r + p.
Proposition 2.6. If t+ s > r + p, the following pairs of (pA, pB) are equilibria. p
A? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
) (sin2 θ < 2(p− s)
t− r + p− s
)
(2.34)
 p
A? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
) (sin2 θ > 2(p− s)
t− r + p− s
)
(2.35)
Proof. We first consider the case where sin2 θ < 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s holds. We write p
A? =
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
. Then Alice’s average payoff is
$A(pA, pB
?) = 12
(
s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ + s
)
+ 12(−(t− r) sin
2 θ + (p− s)(cos2 θ + 1))(pAX + pAY ) (2.36)
Note that the second term is positive for
(
sin2 θ < 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s
)
. Therefore $A(pA
?
, pB
?) ≥
$A(pA, pB
?) for all pA. In the same way, the average payoff of Bob also respects
$B(pA
?
, pB
?) ≥ $A(pA?, pB).
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For sin2 θ > 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s , we write p
A? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
, pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
. Then the
average payoff of Alice is exactly the same as (2.36). Since sin2 θ > 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s , the
second term of (2.36) is negative. Hence it becomes maximal for pAX = pAY = 0,
namely $A(pA
?
, pB
?) ≥ $A(pA, pB?) for all pA. The average payoff of Bob is
$B(pA
?
, pB) = 12
(
r cos2 θ + p sin2 θ + r
)
+ 12(−(p− s) sin
2 θ + (t− r)(cos2 θ + 1))(pBX + pBY ) (2.37)
Since t + s > r + p, the second term is always positive. Therefore $B(pA
?
, pB
?) ≥
$B(pA
?
, pB) for all pB. This ends the proof.
Note that for sin2 θ > 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s and at the equilibrium, the average payoff of Alice
is smaller than that of Bob: $A(pA
?
, pB
?) < $B(pA
?
, pB
?).
In summary, the average payoff of Alice is exhibited in Fig.3.
Figure 3. The average payoff of Alice at the Nash equivalent, when t+ s > r + p
We next consider the case where t + s < r + p. One can show the following
statement as we did before.
Proposition 2.7. If t+ s < r + p, the following pairs of (pA, pB) are equilibria. p
A? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
pB
? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
) (0 ≤ θ ≤ pi2
)
(2.38)
 p
A? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
pB
? =
(
1
2 , 0, 0
1
2
) (sin2 θ > 2(t− r)
t− r + p− s
)
(2.39)
Since 1 < 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s is always true, they satisfy sin
2 θ < 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s . Therefore (2.38)
is an equilibrium for all θ. In summary, the average payoff of Alice is exhibited in
Fig.4 and 5.
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Figure 4. The average payoff of Alice at the Nash equivalent, when t + s < r + p and
2(t− r) > p− s.
Figure 5. The average of Alice’s payoff at the Nash equivalent, when t + s < r + p and
2(t− r) < p− s.
3 Repeated Quantum Games
3.1 Setup
A generic repeated quantum game is summarized as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Repeated Quantum Game). Let {τi}i=1,2,··· be a set of positive
integers and {|ψt〉}t=0,1,··· be a family of quantum states. For each i, put ti = ∑ik τk.
Let {|i〉}i be an orthonormal basis and {ci}i be a set of complex numbers such that∑
i |ci|2 = 1. With respect to each |i〉, suppose that reward to a player n is given by
a certain operator $ˆn in such a way that 〈i| $ˆn |i〉 and 〈i| $ˆn |j〉 = 0 for i 6= j. Then a
general N -persons quantum repeated game proceeds as follows:
1. At any t, the game is in a state
|ψt〉 = ∑
i
ci |i〉 , (3.1)
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2. The time-evolution of the game is given by unitary operators U t
|ψt+1〉 = U t |ψt〉 (3.2)
3. At time t = ti, reward is evaluated and given to players n by a
$tin = f(τi) 〈ψti | $ˆn |ψti〉 , (3.3)
where f(τi) is a function such that f(1) = 1.
4. The total payoff of a player n at time t ∈ [tk, tk+1) is defined by
$n(t) =
k∑
i
δti$tin (3.4)
and in the limit it is $n = limt→∞ $n(t).
Now let us consider the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma. Let |ψt〉 ∈ HA⊗
HB be a state at the tth round. Let {τi}i=1,2,··· be a set of positive integers. We
assume measurement of quantum states is done at the end of the ti =
∑i
k=1 τk
round for each i. For example, τi = 1 for all i means we measure quantum states
every round. Suppose V τi−1+1, · · · , V τi are operators of Alice, then her strategy is
U tiA = V
ti−1+1
A ⊗ · · · ⊗ V ti−1+τiA and the game is in a state
|ψti〉 = J †(U tiA ⊗ U tiB )J
∣∣∣ψti−1〉 (3.5)
which should be measured at the end of ti round. The payoff could depend on τi:
$tiA = f(τi) 〈ψti | $ˆA
∣∣∣ψti〉 , (3.6)
where f(τi) is a certain function of τi. In repeated games, the total payoff is written
with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and in our case it can be introduced in such a way
that
$A =
∑
i
δti$tiA. (3.7)
An interpretation of the discount factor is that the importance of the future payoffs
decreases with time. The measurement periods {τi} can be defined randomly or
predeterminedly. When game’s state is measured every round, the probability of
monitoring signals is classical (see (2.14)). In order to enjoy full quantum games, a
game should evolve with unitary operation.
Since this work is the first study on infinitely repeated quantum games, we focus
on the most fundamental case and investigate a role of entanglement. We will work
on a generic case elsewhere. For this purpose, in what follows, we put τi = 1 for all
i and f(1) = 1. Then the game evolves in such a way that∣∣∣ψt+1〉 = J †(U tA ⊗ U tB)J ∣∣∣ψt〉 , (3.8)
where U tA is her quantum strategy for the tth round. Then her average payoff is
$tA =
〈
ψt
∣∣∣ $ˆA ∣∣∣ψt〉 . (3.9)
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3.2 Equilibria
We define a trigger strategy as follows.
Definition 3.2 (Trigger 1). 1. Alice and Bob play I at time τ if cooperative re-
lation is maintained before time τ .
2. If Alice (Bob) deviates from this cooperative strategy at τ , then Bob (Alice)
chooses either X or Y with equal probability at time τ + 1.
We show that Trigger 1 is an equilibrium of the repeated quantum prisoner’s
dilemma.
Lemma 3.3. Trigger 1 is an equilibrium of the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma
if either one of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. r + p > t+ s
2. r + p < t+ s and sin2 θ < 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s
.
Proof. Suppose they play I for all t. Then Alice’s total payoff is
VA = r + δr + δ2r + · · ·
= r1− δ
(3.10)
Now assume that they play I before t and Alice plays Y at τ . Since Bob plays I at
τ , her maximal payoff is
V ′A = t+ δ$A(pA, pB
?) + δ2$A(pA, pB
?) + · · ·
= t+ δ1− δ$A(p
A, pB
?),
(3.11)
where pB? =
(
0, 12 ,
1
2 , 0
)
. Note that, according to Propositions 2.6 and 2.7, pB? is an
equilibrium of the game.
Choosing Y cannot be her incentive if VA > V ′A, which is equivalent to
r − t+ δ1− δ (r − $A(p
A, pB
?)) > 0. (3.12)
Since r− $A(pA, pB?) is always positive, this inequality is satisfied for a large δ. The
greatest lower bound δinf of such δ is obtained as
δinf =
t− r
t− 12(p+ p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ))
(3.13)
Since δinf is smaller than 1, no deviation will occurs.
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Figure 6. The greatest lower bound δinf of discount factor as a function of the entangle
parameter θ when t+ s > r + p.
If Alice or Bob deviates from cooperative strategy, they choose X or Y with
equal probability along trigger 1. According to Proposition 2.6 and 2.7, choosing
X or Y with equal probability each other is an equilibrium when condition 1,2 are
satisfied. So no deviation occurs, as long as Alice and Bob choose X or Y with equal
probability.
Therefore, trigger 1 can be an equilibrium of the repeated game.
Fig.6 and 7 present the relation between δinf and entanglement. The bigger θ
becomes, the more profit the players can receive, therefore the discount factor δ
should be sufficiently big in order to maintain the cooperative relation when their
states are strongly entangled.
Definition 3.4 (Trigger 2). 1. Alice and Bob play I at time τ if cooperative re-
lation is maintained before time τ .
2. If Bob (Alice) deviates from the cooperative strategy at time τ , then Alice
(Bob) chooses either X or Y with the equal probability at time τ + 1.
3. If Alice and Bob plays X and Y (or Y and X) respectively at time τ , then at
time τ + 1 Alice (Bob) repeats the same strategy, otherwise chooses either X
or Y with the equal probability at time τ + 1.
4. If Alice and Bob repeat X and Y (or Y and X) respectively before time τ and
Bob (Alice) deviates from the repetition at time τ , then Alice (Bob) chooses
either X or Y with the equal probability at time τ + 1.
Deviation 1 means that Alice (Bob) deviates the cooperation and chooses X or
Y . Deviation 2 means that Alice (Bob) chooses I or Z when they should choose
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Figure 7. The greatest lower bound δinf as a function of the entangle parameter θ when
t+ s < r + p
Figure 8. Alice’s strategy diagram against Bob’s strategies
X or Y with the equal probability. According to Proposition 2.6, it can happen
when sin2 θ > 2(p−s)
t−r+p−s . Deviation 3 means that Alice (Bob) chooses I or Z when
Alice should play X (Y ) and Bob should play Y (X), respectively. It can happen at
sin2 θ > p−s
t−r+p−s . This is because that if an opponent chooses Y (X), choosing Z (I)
against X (Y ) can yield more profit.
We can modify Trigger 1 and redefine Trigger 2 so that for all θ, it can be a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 3.5 (Trigger 2). Trigger 2 is an equilibrium of the repeated game for r > t+p2 .
Proof. We first address the case where Alice choose deviation 1. Her total expected
payoff when she plays I is VA = r1−δ . If Alice chosen deviation 1, Alice and Bob choose
X or Y with the equal probability. (X,X), (X, Y ), (Y,X), (Y, Y ) can occur with the
equal probability. In this round, the expected payoff is 12 (p+ p cos
2 θ + r sin2 θ). If
(X,X) or (Y, Y ) is played, they should choose X or Y in the next round. If (X, Y )
or (Y,X) is played, they should choose the same quantum strategy as last time in
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the next round. Therefore her maximal expected payoff for choosing deviation 1 is
V ′A = t+
+∞∑
t=1
δt
(1
2
)t
($A(X,X) + $A(X, Y )) +
+∞∑
s=1
+∞∑
t=1
δs+t
(1
2
)s
$A(X, Y )
= t+
δ
2
1− δ2
(
p+ 11− δ
(
p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ
)) (3.14)
She does not have an incentive to choose deviation 1 when VA − V ′A > 0, which can
happen is δ is large.
Regarding deviation 2, Alice’s total expected payoff when she choose either X
or Y with the equal probability is
VA =
1
2
1− δ2
(
p+ 11− δ
(
p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ
))
(3.15)
and her maximal expected payoff for choosing deviation 2 is
V ′A =
s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ
2 + δVA. (3.16)
She does not have an incentive to choose deviation 2 if VA−V ′A > 0, which is satisfied
for a large δ.
On deviation 3, Alice’s total expected payoff for choosing X (Y ) while Bob
choosing Y (X) is
VA =
$A(X, Y )
1− δ
= p cos
2 θ + r sin2 θ
1− δ
(3.17)
Her maximal expected payoff for choosing deviation 3 is
V ′A = s cos2 θ + t sin2 θ + δ
( 1
2
1− δ2
(
p+ 11− δ
(
p cos2 θ + r sin2 θ
)))
(3.18)
since Alice and Bob choose X or Y with the equal probability along trigger 2. She
does not have an incentive to choose deviation 3 if VA − V ′A > 0, which is satisfied
for a large δ.
For all cases, one can find δ < 1 that does not endows a player with an incentive
for deviation.
The curves in Fig. 9 presents the relation between θ and the greatest lower
bound δinf of δ that respects the condition VA − V ′A > 0. Such δ lives in the colored
region in the figure.
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Figure 9. The region where trigger 2 becomes an equilibrium when r > t+p2
3.3 Folk Theorem
3.3.1 Pure Quantum Strategy
We first consider both players choose pure strategies. Hence the set of strategies is
A = {I,X, Y, Z} × {I,X, Y, Z}. We write a pair of Alice and Bob’s profit $(a) =
($A(a), $B(a)) for a strategy a ∈ A. And let ν be the profit per single round of the
repeated game. Then it turns out that they can receive profit ν in V (Fig.10 and
11).
V =
{
ν ∈ R2
∣∣∣∣∣ν = ∑
a∈A
p(a)$(a), p(a) ≥ 0,∑
a∈A
p(a) = 1
}
(3.19)
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Figure 10. Domain of profit for r > t+s2
Figure 11. Domain of profit for r < t+s2
Alice’s mini-max value is defined as
νA = min
UB
max
UA
$A(UA, UB), (3.20)
which is shown in Fig.12. If νA is smaller than max
{
r, t+s2
}
, then there exists a
subgame perfect equilibrium. This can be summarized as follows.
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Theorem 3.6. While players choose pure quantum strategies, there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma if
sin2 θ <
max
{
r, t+s2
}
− s
t− s . (3.21)
Figure 12. The mini-max value of Alice when both Alice and Bob choose only pure
strategies.
3.3.2 Mixed Quantum Strategy
The mini-max value for the mixed strategy case is defined as
νA = min
PB
max
pA
$A(pA, pB), (3.22)
which is shown in Fig13 and 14. There is a subgame perfect equilibrium since νA <
max
{
r, t+s2
}
is always satisfied. Note that, for all entanglement parameter θ there
exists non-empty region
V ? =
{
ν ∈ V
∣∣∣νi > νi, i = A,B} , (3.23)
which we call the feasible and individually rational payoff set. If Alice and Bob are
entangled, the mini-max vale becomes large and the area of V ? gets small. Especially,
the area of V ? becomes the smallest when states are maximally entangled θ = pi2 and is
exhibited as the dark parts of Fig.15 and 16. It does not contain (r, r) when θ = pi2 ,
therefore a notable difference between classical and quantum repeated prisoner’s
dilemma is the following.
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Figure 13. The mini-max value of Alice for t+ s > r+ p when they play mixed strategies
Figure 14. The mini-max value of Alice for t+ s < r+ p when they play mixed strategies
Theorem 3.7 (Anti-Folk Theorem). When Alice and Bob are maximally entangled,
cooperation and cooperation cannot be realized unless r ≥ t+s2 .
In the classical repeated prisoner’s game, cooperation and cooperation is the
Pareto optimal solution and can be an equilibrium of the repeated game, called
the Folk theorem, whereas it is not true for the quantum repeated game. For the
case of our quantum game, one can always find a better solution that makes their
payoff larger than choosing cooperation and cooperation. So in order to establish
the cooperative relation, they require a sufficiently large reward r for cooperating.
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Figure 15. The feasible and individually rational payoff set for r > t+s2
Figure 16. The feasible and individually rational payoff set for r < t+s2
Based on a similar argument for the classical Folk theorem, we obtain its quan-
tum version.
Theorem 3.8 (Quantum Folk Theorem). For all entanglement parameter θ, there
exists an appropriate discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) such that any payoff in the feasible
and individually rational payoff set V ?.
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Proof. Let mA be Alice’s mixed strategy that endows Bob with the mini-max value.
Then if the round-average payoff for playing a? ∈ A is in V ?, the following is an
equilibrium.
1. Choose a? ∈ A unless deviation occurs.
2. If deviation is observed, the both play m = (mA,mB) for the next T rounds,
then the both play a?.
3. Once if m is not chosen in the T rounds, the both again choose m for the
succeeding T rounds.
Here T is chosen as
di < T ($i(a?)− $i(m)), (i = A,B) (3.24)
where di = maxai{$i(ai, a?−i)− $i(a?)}.
One can complete the proof of the above as did in [10].
4 Conclusion
In this work we established the concept of a generic N -persons repeated quantum
game and addressed repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma. Based on Definition 3.1,
we addressed the repeated quantum prisoner’s dilemma for the case of τi = 1 for all i.
Even though the game evolves in a classical manner, repetition of the quantum game
is much different from the classical repeated prisoner’s dilemma (Theorem 3.7) and
obtained a novel feasible and individually rational set V ? for the repeated quantum
prisoner’s dilemma (Theorem 3.8).
There are many research directions of the repeated quantum games. For example,
it will be interesting to address cases where τi 6= 1. In this work we focused on the
τi = 1 case and as a result we clarified a role of entanglement θ. From a viewpoint
of quantum computation, the complex probability coefficients ci are important as
well as entanglement. Taking into account of it, studying more on a generic time-
evolution of the quantum game is crucial and it is necessary to introduce general
review periods τi which the players should not know a priori.
Furthermore, it is important to address cooperative game theory from a view-
point of repeated quantum games. A cooperative game has multiple Nash equilibria,
whereas a non-cooperative game has at most one. The prisoner’s dilemma is an
example of non-cooperative games.
Moreover it is also interesting to apply quantum repeated games not only to
economics but also to other fields. For example, machine learning can be regarded as
a repeated game and we have a motivation to look at quantum machine learning from
a viewpoint of repeated quantum games. Generative adversarial networks (GANs)
could be a typical example of a repeated game.
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